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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the connection between Antifederalist objections to Constitutional
ratification and modern-day public opinion on related topics to see the long-term validity of the
Antifederalist claims. Using Pew Research Center data, this study focuses on topics of rural
consciousness, nationalism, presidential identity, governmental distance from constituency, and
the Electoral College as proxies through which to consider Antifederalist claims. The use of
proxies is meant to allow the contextualization of Antifederalist attitudes within a context that
will produce meaningful public opinion data. This paper also seeks to find explanatory variables
for the trends discovered in the data. The results show that the core ideas behind Antifederalist
concerns are still largely present within the American public, specifically related to nationalism,
congress being too distant from the constituency, and the Constitution being too difficult to
amend. The growth of presidential power making presidential identity unimportant, though, is
not present and thus contradict part of Antifederalist claims. This study adds to the field of
American politics by taking a novel approach in considering the long-lasting impact of
Antifederalism. This group is frequently overlooked and discounted, but this study shows that,
perhaps, they deserve to be given more credit for their anxieties than they often are.
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The Antifederalists, or those that opposed the ratification of the United States Constitution
held a variety of beliefs as to why they took issue with the Constitution. At a bare minimum,
some believed the document needed more thorough consideration and debate while others
believed there were fundamental issues that needed to be fixed before its adoption. This can best
be summarized by a quote from Patrick Henry, a famous antifederalist: “my great objection to
this Government is, that it does not leave us the means of defending our rights; Or, of waging
war against tyrants” (qtd. in Ketcham 203). Yet, others believed that the Constitution should be
rejected entirely, and the United States should be governed under a system closer to that outlined
in the Articles of Confederation (Klarman 309). Federalists posed these individuals to the public
as closeted loyalists who wanted to the see the United States returned to British rule or as state
office holders who did not want their own power diminished (Klarman 307). However, the
diversity of thought within the Antifederalist camp makes it clear that their motivations were not
as simple as any of the attacks waged against them. As is obvious, the Antifederalists lost the
argument and the Constitution was ratified on June 21, 1788, when New Hampshire became the
9th of the 13 states to ratify it. Rhode Island was the final of the 13 original states to ratify the
Constitution on May 29, 1790, with the Bill of Rights being added in 1791.
Dissatisfaction with the government and how it was framed, though, did not end with the
Antifederalists. It has continued throughout United States history, as early as the start of the
Democratic-Republican Party in 1792. Interestingly though, this party, which began as a
rebellion of sorts against the idea of not having strong political parties, became the dominant
political faction until 1825, even leading to the downfall of the Federalists (Heidenreich 330). A
more modern example is that of the Tea Party Movement that came to rise after the election of
President Barack Obama in 2008 and gained prominence on Tax Day 2009 (Madestam, et al.
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1633). There will never be full assent within a republican form of government. Disagreement,
debate, and compromise are cornerstones of the democratic process and without them, no true
democracy would exist. But the question exists if, at the core, the issues that Americans have
today with the government are in line with the fears of the Antifederalists. And if so, do they
follow certain demographic and partisan lines or are they dispersed throughout the voting aged
population evenly?
This paper begins with an account of the central antifederalist arguments. I use these points
to make connections to 21st century issues that thematically match. The following section is a
literature of these modern issues that leads to the hypothesized results for each issue.
Next, there is the public opinion data analysis. Polling data from Pew Research Center is the
primary source of data to show that four of the five areas of interest provide support for the idea
that the Antifederalist concerns have manifested in modern American Politics. Regression
analysis is run to see if there are any demographic trends in the results. Finally, I conclude with
the implications on modern American politics and future areas of research that should be
explored.
The Antifederalist Papers
The Antifederalist Papers were published after the final version of the Constitution was
agreed upon by the Founding Fathers but prior to its ratification. This would date them post-1787
and into the early 1790s. Unlike the Federalists who actively collaborated to publish the
Federalist Papers, the Antifederalist Papers were written by a variety of anonymous men who
had little, if any communication with each other. It was not an organized effort; instead, it was
various authors who published in a variety of locations and formats, such as newspapers and
pamphlets (Historical Society of the New York Courts). What they coalesced around was a belief
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that the Federalist goals were “the lust of ambitious men” (Ketcham xxvi). The push for big
government only bolstered this claim in the eyes of the Antifederalists.
As such, there is no canonical list of the papers and until the mid-1900s there was no
published compilation of the papers. Below is an analysis of the papers that are generally
considered to be the most important when looking at specific objections as opposed to overall
philosophical ones (Ketcham xxiv). Ketcham even explains the ordering in his compilation as
being meant to tell a story of the evolution of Antifederalist political thought (Ketcham xxiv).
However, it is an incomplete account of the entirety of antifederalist thought at the time. This is a
limitation, but with the similarities in concerns across the various groups of papers being used, it
is clear that these ideas were quite prevalent. Furthermore, with being the most influential
papers, there is likely to be some modern reasoning for this distinction; perhaps that the ideas are
similar to modern concerns.
The Federalist papers, contrastingly, were written by a prearranged group of men, Alexander
Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. There was a total of 85 essays published across The
New York Journal, Independent Journal, New York Advertiser, and Daily Advertiser with some
cross publication depending on the paper. This was an attempt to persuade the public to accept
the newly signed Constitution and to encourage the process of ratification. At this point, the
Antifederalists had already begun their writing and the Federalists saw a need to defend their
choices to the public (Lloyd).
The selected concerns for this research are varied, yet needs to be in order to give a wellrounded picture of Antifederalist dissent. The ability of representatives to connect with their
constituency, potential issues with a democratic republican form of government, difficulty to
amend the Constitution, and the inevitable growth of the presidency are the focuses of this
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research. These will be translated into the modern context though an examination of, approval
over different levels of government to assess the ability of Congress to connect to constituencies
compared to local government and state government, nationalist ideology in multiple contexts, of
the difficulty to change the Constitution by using the Electoral College as a proxy, and
presidentialism and if people think the identity of the president actually has an impact.
Republican Form of Government Over a Large Territory
The next major concern is that of a republican democracy being able to effectively govern a
large territory. A republican democracy is a governmental structure where the people vote for
representatives who then vote on laws and other major topics. This is unlike direct democracy
where every person has a vote in every decision. A republican democracy relies on the elected
representatives making the best decision for their constituents. This results in a very small
number of people making all crucial decisions for the entire population. It is important to frame
this within the fact that the antifederalists had an issue with a republican democracy being used
for only the 13 original states. Today that seems laughable, but there was no easy form of
communication or travel so faith was being put in this system when there was no way for states
to contact federal officials immediately.
Different antifederalists had different views on why, but one thing was very clear: “a very
extensive territory cannot be governed on the principles of freedom” (qtd. in Ketcham 249).
Centinel expressed that “a republican, or free government can only exist where the body of the
people are virtuous, and where property is equally divided” (qtd. in Ketcham 236). This created
an issue on two fronts. First, if there is a fundamental concern with corruption and personal
benefit from holding seats in government, there is the implicit belief that these people will not be
virtuous. Extending this to the common person who had no reason to not be self-interested,
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expecting virtuosity was an unrealistic standard. Also, nobody was under the illusion that
property was equally divided. Between slavery and the way land was held by select families and
passed down within families, there was far from equal property division. These together mean
that according to Centinel, there would need to be a massive overhaul of society more broadly
before a free republican government could even be entertained as an option. Regardless of his
other opinion, this would completely rule out ratifying the Constitution in good faith.
Brutus was of the belief that “One government and general legislation alone, never can
extend equal benefits to all parts of the United States” (qtd. in Ketcham 275). This touches upon
the issue of state governments not having enough power and the federal government not
understanding the needs of all parts of the country. The needs of Rhode Island, for example,
were very different than those of Virginia than those of Georgia. This can also be said for today,
but it is undeniable that the regional differences that existed back then made it hard to imagine
any legislation being mutually beneficial. Not only would this result in significant portions of the
population always being unhappy, but it would not best serve the populations that needed it.
Farmers would always see themselves as being overshadowed by the cosmopolitan elites, and
vice versa.
Congressional/State Issues
One of the most central themes in The Antifederalist Papers has to do with concerns about
Congress. These can be divided into the sub-issues of broad congressional concerns and concerns
with the branches of congress. Fears about Congress as an institution centered around the
amount of power that they had. There was the overwhelming fear that “the powers vested in
Congress…[would] annihilate and absorb the legislative, executive, and judicial, powers of the
several states” (qtd. in Ketcham 250). The Framers intentionally placed the Legislative branch
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first in the Constitution, under Article I. This was due to the amount of power that was being
placed in their hands, and therefore, close to the people. At this point, in history, the House of
Representatives was the only directly elected part of the national government, so by giving them
a share of most of the power and obligations, the people likely saw this as being more closely
connected to them and their conscious choices (History of the House). Additionally, the senate
was created with the express goal of state rights and minority interests (Origins and
Development, U.S. Senate).
But the antifederalists saw this as being too liberal and too trusting that Congress would not
abuse their power. They may be a larger group of people than any other branch, but that did not
prevent them from being more focused on “private interest and ambition” than community and
thus resulting in a permanent aristocracy (Cato qtd. in Ketcham 236, 242). This fear was
reasonable and understandable given the history of despotic, tyrannical rule by the British
monarchy.
Yet, being independent from the British monarchy would not stop the same aristocracy from
developing in the United States. This was emphasized by asking that the people “must recollect
how disproportionately the democratic and aristocratic parts of the community group were
represented” (Letters from a Federal Farmer qtd. in Ketcham 273). It is impossible to ignore
how all the Framers were landowning, elite, white men. Nobody outside of the upper echelons of
society had any say in the way the government was structured, yet those men claimed to
represent all people that the government deemed worthy of representation. Yet, they were
aristocrats themselves and were the exact sect that they were concerned about having too much
power. The antifederalists were elites too, and that cannot be ignored, but they at least
recognized it and wanted the people to notice the hypocrisy. How could a democratic
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government for all be designed by men who were elites and did not know the concerns of
common people? The antifederalists did not claim to know the answer or offer an alternative, but
they believed it was a flaw and wanted people to recognize it.
Another prominent argument was the fear of a strong federal government at the expense of
state governments. Federalism, or the system under which there is a strong central government
along with smaller state governments, would inevitably result in a stronger centralized
government and weaker state governments. It was baked into the Constitution. The
antifederalists took issue with the implied faith in federal officials and asked, “Why should the
citizens not trust their state governments, to a certain degree, but have faith that the powerhungry federal officials who are out of touch with the average citizen does not need to be reined
in just the same” (John DeWitt qtd. in Ketcham 332-333). People would be significantly more
familiar with their state officials than federal ones. Federal officials could be seen as wanting
more for their career than the people they represent. State officials have less incentive in their
positions and have less opportunity to benefit themselves. The idea that people were supposed to
be more suspicious of their state officials despite this, struck the antifederalists as being a sign of
an issue with the government structure. This connection with state officials versus federal
officials is still true today, even with improved communication and travel.
Transitioning to issues directly with the Senate and the House, the first and perhaps most
important concern is that of the amount of representation in Congress. There were two central
proposals for this structure before the current system of Congress came to be. First, there was the
Virginia Plan that proposed a bicameral legislature, like we have today, but with both houses
allocating state representation based on population. This would have favored the larger states and
was seen as unacceptable to smaller states. The alternative was the New Jersey Plan which
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proposed a unicameral legislature where all states, regardless of size, would have the same
number of representatives. This, unsurprisingly, was seen as unacceptable to larger states. The
system known as the Connecticut Plan, or the Great Compromise, was the ultimate form of
congressional organization laid out in the Constitution and remains the system used today. There
is a bicameral legislature which consists of proportional representation in the lower house
(House of Representatives) and equal representation in the upper house (Senate).
Despite the compromise, different antifederalists took issue with the organization of
Congress for various reasons. In Cato V, it is expressed that “it is a very important objection to
this government, that the representation consists of so few; too few to resist the influence of
corruption and their temptation of treachery” (qtd. in Ketcham 340). He does not go on to
explain his solution to this problem, be it a larger House or more Senators for each state. Based
upon his view that representation as a whole is inadequate it would not be impossible to imagine
Cato wanted both houses to be expanded. He would likely see it as being best to have as many
people as possible involved to thwart any possible corruption that might arise. This matches
earlier concerns about dishonesty in government and the fear of officials using their positions to
only benefit themselves.
Patrick Henry was instead concerned about what the structure of the House meant for small
states: “the number [of representatives] might be reduced so much [by Congress], that some
States should have no Representative at all” (qtd. in Ketcham 202). The Constitution leaves the
process by which to expand House size and determine the number for each state open in a way
that theoretically each small state under a certain size could have been given only one
representative each. It would benefit large states to minimize the representation of small states
and Henry feared the lack of explicit regulation preventing this from happening. This is a
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fundamentally different objection than in Cato since it deals with the democratic process within
itself. But it is not that different since it still deals with the issue of government officials using
their positions to help themselves.
The man who wrote under the pseudonym Centinel was not happy with how either branch of
Congress was to be organized. He believed that the House would be too small and incapable of
dealing with local problems while escaping corruption and simultaneously thought that the
Senate was unequal and contributed to a future of aristocracy (qtd in. Ketcham 241). This is a
unique position as, generally, the framers and societal elites were content with the Connecticut
Compromise, which established the bicameral legislature. It was not seen as a win for anybody,
necessarily, but seen as an alternative to endless infighting between small and large states.
Centinel found issues with both houses and did not see either as being a permanent solution to
the issues that the Confederation of States was facing. However, he did not offer solutions either.
This is not common throughout The Antifederalist Papers. Normally, there is some alternative
offered or some suggestions made, but here Centinel focuses on explaining the issues as opposed
to coming up with solutions.
In fact, no solutions regarding Congress are offered up. This seems to be an issue that even
though the opposed what was proposed, Antifederalists did not necessarily know what the
alternative would be. The structure was already set up for Congress and perhaps they did not see
an easy fix that would be persuadable. It is not outside the scope of reason to think that
suggesting an entirely different body than the one proposed by the Framers would not be
supported. Antifederalists already risked being seen as traitors so trying to dismantle a core piece
of the newly structured government would not have been advantageous.
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Growth of the Presidency
Presidential power was certainly an area of concern for the antifederalists, but less fervently
that other issue areas. The major issue revolved around the assumption that “the president cannot
represent you because he is not of your own immediate choice” (Cato qtd. in Ketcham 337). This
connects to the broad antifederalist sentiment that the government who is meant to be
representative of the people should be elected directly by the people. The electoral college was
not binding like it is today. So thus, electors could go against the popular vote of their state if
they determined that it was “necessary”. This made it impossible for the antifederalists to even
have the illusion that the president would be directly elected. Compare this to senators being
chosen by the state governments. The state governments were directly elected, so it could be said
that they are executing the will of the people they represent when picking senators. To modern
Americans this might seem absurd, but it was a valid argument at the time. If the electoral
college was structured similarly, the antifederalists might not have raised this issue.
Further, another concern about the structure of the presidency and the possibility for a
massive growth of power was the “improper connection” between the Senate and the President
(Cato qtd. in Ketcham 341). This fear was mostly on the basis that with the two institutions being
so connected, how will there ever be true checks and balances? Could the people trust that any
necessary impeachment proceeding would be held justly and correctly? Would Senate be an
“impartial judicature” (Cato qtd. in Ketcham 341)? These were all issues in the minds of
antifederalists when looking at the structure of the presidency. All of this would breed a system
where elites were rewarded, and a new aristocracy would form within a system that was meant to
be democratic and represent everybody.
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Changing the Constitution
Changing the Constitution was designed to be hard. This was purposeful by the Framers in
order to avoid any tyrannical leaders or members of federal government from taking advantage.
But to the antifederalists, this difficulty went beyond what was needed to ensure adequate
protection. To them it set unrealistic standards. John DeWitt wrote in his third paper that, “to
obtain that majority of 3/4 to any one single alteration, essentially affecting this or any other
state, amounts to an absolute impossibility” (qtd. in Ketcham 194). While he did not directly
state this, it is likely that DeWitt predicted the need to update the Constitution over time,
including in times of crisis. The original 13 states were cohesive enough to come together to
draft the Constitution but there were massive differences regionally. The biggest of which being
slavery. The Framers knew slavery was going to be an issue later, as can be seen in the ThreeFifths Compromise, for example, and with the simple existence of slavery. DeWitt and other
antifederalists may not have been thinking about the slavery issue explicitly, but it gives an
example of the way that amending the Constitution was predictable at the time of ratification. So
it makes sense that seeing ¾ of states agreeing to any single change would be seen as setting up
the country for failure. This links back to the idea a democratic republican form of government
being potentially problematic. It would be particularly difficult to get ¾ of the country to agree
on something when interests are not the same from region to region, or even state to state.
Having such diversity in thought and needs contributes to the success of a country, but when
there is a ¾ consent requirement to make any major change, it would be difficult to see this being
a system that stands the test of time.
DeWitt reasoned that “a bare majority in these four small States may hinder the adoption of
amendments; So that we may fairly unjustly conclude that one-twentieth part of the American
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people, may prevent the removal of the most grievous inconveniences and oppression, by
refusing to accede to amendments” (qtd. in Ketcham 205). This not only explains the logic
behind his stance being that a very small minority could force the will of the whole country but
reckons back to the fear of a strong centralized government, with officials not directly elected,
having too much power. Fear of tyranny and the will of the minority being ignored was a
consistent theme throughout the Antifederalist Papers. Both the good and the bad of the system
the Framers created is the way our republican democracy gives equal power, in some situations,
to all states regardless of population. In the context of constitutional change, this presents an
unequal power dynamic within the states. The small states, as a result, have outsized power.
While this was not necessarily perfectly foreseeable in the modern context, as it would have
required the understanding of how the population would grow and be geographically distributed,
there was certainly some portent of it in the population distribution of colonial America.
Modern Issues and Public Opinion
The concerns of the Antifederalists cannot be directly transposed onto the modern context of
the 21st century. The political, social, and economic conditions are far too different to draw a
direct comparison. There would also be an issue with finding public opinion data that would be
adequate. In order to solve this issue, modern issues with the same core issue as presented by the
Antifederalists will be the subject of public opinion data. This will allow the data to show
whether or not the broad concern and theme is relevant instead of looking at the exact wording
and context that the Antifederalists anticipated in the late 1700s.
Nationalism
Nationalism, especially in the United States, can take many forms. In this research there will
be a focus on rural consciousness, or the idea that there is something unique about living in a
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rural area that suburban and urban dwellers cannot understand, and exclusionary nationalism that
promotes American interests and excludes anything and anybody that is not seen as American.
This will be able to give insight as to if the Antifederalists were correct that one unified
democratic republic cannot effectively rule such a large geographic area and population.
Rural consciousness is a specific form of nationalism. At its core is the belief that “decision
makers routinely ignore rural places and failed to give rural communities their fair share of
resources” (Cramer 5). This of course would create resentment and a feeling of being valued less
than other citizens. This resentment comes a perceived lack of power compared to city dwellers.
And this occurs on many issues; it is not restricted to areas that would seemingly be directly
impacted by being rural vs. urban (Cramer 60). It is also not just that rural residents feel as if
their interests are not protected, they also do not think their concerns are being heard by those in
power (Cramer 65). This adds the element of choosing not to listen, not just ignoring their needs.
It is easy to see how over time and generationally this would create the feeling of being ignored
and left behind that would lead to resentment.
One cannot dismiss how strongly rural citizens identity with being a rural citizen. There are
of course many social group identities, but it was found by Cramer that “[people] in rural areas
used identities rooted in place and class…” (Cramer 6). Class cannot be dismissed as a part of
the rural identify given that rates of poverty in rural areas is higher than in urban areas, especially
for racial minorities (Rural Health Information Hub). Identities related to place though are more
complicated. They generally function on the core belief that rural residents are proud of where
they live despite the stereotypes that city dwellers have of them (Cramer 66). And moreover, the
presence of these stereotypes makes urban residents unqualified to make decisions that impact
the lives of rural communities (Cramer 67). This fundamental divide between rural and urban
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residents creates an idea that there are two types of Americans. Even if this is an incidental effect
of rural consciousness, it is clearly an important one.
The perception of two Americas is especially prevalent when looking at how rural residents
view hard work. Hard work is seen by rural residents as a necessary component of life given the
economic realities they face. As well, non-hardworking people are lazy and undeserving of
respect and public support (Cramer 72). This may read as harsh, but it is similar to the common
adage of puling yourself up by your bootstraps. If you are not willing to help yourself then you
are not deserving of the help of others. This is a central idea to the greatness of America:
anybody can make anything of themselves if they try hard enough. Rural people see this as a
necessary part of life and something that urban residents do not have the same appreciation for.
This contributes to a substantial divide in the thought process of who deserves what and what
parts of the country are not given their fair share.
Antifederalists would think it impossible for rural communities as well as more urban
communities to both be happy and well served. Their interests are far too different on many
fronts. This, along with the idea that rural life creates a unique set of thought processes,
illustrates the fear that a diverse country could never be effectively governed by a democratic
republic. No group will get everything they need, and the compromise required will leave no
group adequately assisted. This leads to the idea that due to the massive impact of rural
consciousness and the overruling impact of this group identity, rural residents would align most
with Antifederalist attitudes. More specifically, H1: Residents of rural communities, regardless
of demographics, will view rural communities as underfunded. As well, they will see suburban
and urban communities as being overfunded while those residents will see the level of aid as
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more fair. This trend will be strengthened as age increases due to the amount of time that people
have dealt with the consequences of over/underfunding.
A more traditional, exclusionary form of nationalism is engrained in the American psyche
without citizens even knowing it. Much of what children are taught to be nationalism is more
aligned with patriotism: being proud to be an American and being lucky to live here. Nationalism
though is also impressed from a young age. We are, realistically, taught a “mythical” version of
the United States’ history, role in international politics, our existing societal structures, and
economic system. Core to this system is the idea that questioning the past or present actions of
the country means you hate America (Lieven 2). Lieven traces this back to how Americans have
a “quasi-religious veneration for the Constitution and the founders” that does not allow us to
reflect on the changing needs of our society and the consequences of actions taken by the
founders as well as the inability to question the United States’ “sinfulness” (Lieven 2, 53).
There are generally considered to be two core elements to American nationalism: (1) The
American Creed, or “the set of great democratic, legal, and individualist beliefs and principles on
which the American state and constitution are founded”, and (2) the American antithesis where
nationalistic pride stems from ethnoreligious roots (Lieven 6-7). The major issue is with the
latter. This type of ethnoreligious motivated action is normally seen as a thing of the past, such
as. the Trail of Tears, Chinese exclusion, Japanese internment, etc. However, this ethnoreligious
framework is central to today’s radical conservatives, such as the Christian right or the Tea Party
(Lieven 8). This only leads to hatred of certain groups both within the country and outside of it.
Immigrants get targeted a well as other countries are framed as inherently or impossible of
working with. The United States is thus protected as being the best country in the world and the
exemplar of democratic values and systems without acknowledging the internal flaws that the
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United States has (Lieven 47). Not only does this create internal division between ethnoreligious
groups, but it also creates division between people that believe and don’t believe such rhetoric.
There is no way for all groups to be happy with the same policies as their politics are so
different.
This rhetoric was especially powerful during the election of 2016 when “findings revealed a
fear that American global dominance was in danger” (Chokshi). 2016 is far from the first time
this has been the case, and in fact led to many of the nationalistic policies discussed above.
However, this time, it was combined with the “a subset of primarily younger and well-educated
Americans lack[ing] any strong form of patriotic sentiment; [while] a larger class, primarily
older and less well educated, embrace every form of nationalist sentiment” (Bonikowski and
DiMaggio 949). Further divide was created among age and education lines and as such, people
began to see other demographic groups as the not being proud to be an American. Older and
lower educated Americans could see younger individuals as hating America while the young
people see themselves as simply acknowledging the flaws of the United States and finding it
hard to be particularly patriotic about. There also appears to be a partisan divide that implies
different factors matter for each major party. Bonikowski and DiMaggio suggest that “the most
ardent nationalists tend to statistically be white men with only a high school education. They also
tend to be Evangelical, or highly religious, older, and strong Republicans. The young, more
highly educated, and self-identified Democrats tended to be overwhelmingly less nationalistic”
(Bonikowski and DiMaggio 959-961). It’s clear here that this is a vast generalization, but
Republicans are more nationalistic than Democrats. Even though education and age can impact
the amount of nationalism, the partisan trends are present.
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As such, this leads into H2: Republicans with college or advanced degrees will have about
the same, or a slightly higher, view of the United States as do Republicans with a college degree
or less. For Democrats, those with less education will have a more favorable view of the United
States. However, for Democrats there will also be an age factor where younger Democrats aged
18-29 will have a much lower view of the United States than any other age group. This
hypothesis begins with the preliminary assumption that the parties will fundamentally be
different. But within this assumption, there is still the factor that education is extremely
important in both groups. As well, it would be remiss to not take into consideration the age effect
for nationalism, especially within the already less nationalistic group. Antifederalists be aligned
with the idea that there would be a division between different groups in terms of nationalism.
Those that are best served by the actions of the democratic republic will be more nationalistic
and those who feel like their interests are ignored and want change will be less proud to be
American.
Presidentialism
The president was not meant to have the amount of power he has today. The founders
intended for Congress to have the vast majority of the power. However, it was not too long after
the ratification of the Constitution that presidential power began to grow. Andrew Jackson was
the first to truly expand the presidency. It could be said that he embodied the fears of
Antifederalists that the president would become an elected king. Jackson was known as “King
Andrew the First” by critics, mostly due to his disregard for congress in terms of military action
and the debate over the Bank of the United States (Yoo 106). He set a precedent for the
executive branch being co-equal to Congress as well as the president interpreting the
Constitution and not deferring to Congress or the courts to do so (Yoo 150-151).
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The next major shift to presidential power came during the Civil War. Lincoln, admittedly,
went beyond the constitutional bounds of presidential power in order to preserve the union. The
largest of these was the way he subverted Congress and acted unilaterally when Congress was
out of session. This was an issue due to it being Congress’s responsibility to declare war, yet
Lincoln enacted a military blockade against the South, which is generally considered an act of
war (Savage 17). This did not have as long-lasting effects as Jackson’s actions since it was seen
as an exceptional time that could allow for exceptional actions. If the circumstances had been
different, it is unimaginable that Lincoln would not have been impeached.
Theodore Roosevelt, on the other hand, did take a stance that had permanent consequences.
He was the first president to outwardly declare that the president had the right to do anything that
he was not explicitly forbidden from doing. This became known as the theory of inherent power
(Savage 17). This would all many later presidents to expand the powers of the presidency simply
by the precedent set. Interestingly, it could be said that without this precedent, Franklin
Roosevelt would not have been able to have such sweeping policies enacted for the New Deal.
Post-World War II and into the Cold War is considered to be when the modern era of the
presidency began. It is often characterized by the “the ‘imperial’ power invested in the
presidency…[as]these presidents and their men began arguing that the modern world was too
dangerous and complex for president’s hands to be tied” (Savage 14). There was a substantial
rise in unilateral action as seen in Truman saying that the president had the “unwritten power to
take the country into a major overseas war on his word alone” and Reagan asserting “it was
unconstitutional for Congress to pass laws giving executive branch officials independence from
presidential control” (Savage 19, 48). At the time, these were major upheavals, but today they
seem as if they were features of the presidency that always existed. No matter the party of the
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president, there have been times when these precedents were used to the executive branch’s
benefit. This is what leads to the question if who the president is really matters or if they all at
the same in the long run.
Congress did not sit by and let this happen without a fight, though. Especially after
Watergate, congress began passing laws that empowered public scrutiny and required
information about intelligence gathering to be shared with the legislative and judicial branches
(Savage 89). This represented a big move on congress’s part to try to reign in presidential power.
While it was not necessarily successful and was too little too late, it was something to be done to
temper the presidency. And after Watergate was the perfect time to make this attempt. The
public was generally suspicious of the executive branch at that point and would have been
receptive to such policies. 9/11, though, also entirely reversed any willingness for the public to
allow a limit on presidential power. The Bush administration seized the opportunity of the public
wanting protection and “dramatically expand the zone of secrecy surrounding the executive
branch” (Savage 93). This was accompanied by an increase in presidential war powers and
control over parts of the bureaucracy that still exists today.
More theoretically, there is the idea that as the selection of presidents evolved, such as
actively campaigning, the character of presidents and American politics in general changed
(Crenson and Ginsberg 43). When looking at the 20th century, there is “the expansion of
presidential war and spending powers, the increased prominence of executive orders and other
presidential policy instruments, along with the introduction and expansion of regulatory review
through the OMB” which led to a massive shift in political power to the presidency (Crenson and
Ginsberg 26). This shift, though, did not happen through sheer will alone. Congress had to allow
a gap that needed to be filled. Crenson and Ginsberg assert that once Congress was facing
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increased polarization and thus was less able to unify, the executive branch was able to come in
and take some of the power (Crenson and Ginsberg 31). This may make it seem as if the political
system is a competition for who has what and how much power. That would not be entirely
incorrect given the way in which the president and Congress are often opposed both politically
and in terms of their goals. Even when one party hold both the presidency and both houses of
Congress it can be difficult to get things accomplished so what may seem like incidental power
can amount to a lot in the long run.
In line with the Antifederalist assumption is, thus, H3: As presidential power has grown over
time, the identity of the president will be seen as having less of an impact. People have likely
evolved to think that the Institution of the presidency is more important than the President
himself. This will be especially true for both Republicans and Democrats with less than a
college degree and those who are younger. This hypothesis is directly related to the
Antifederalist sentiment and will be able to either bolster or work against the Antifederalist
concerns. Fearing the rise of institutional power and having a de facto king in the presidency, the
modern Antifederalists would be those that believe the indemnity of the president does not
matter or matters very little. Education and age are hypothesized as being important for different
reasons. Education will be impactful on the basis that those with lower education levels will not
have the same level of political knowledge and do not have the background knowledge required
to understand the evolution of the presidency and the intended role of the presidency. Age
connects to disillusionment. Younger people that have more recently aged into the ability to be
politically active have not had the time to acclimatize to the system. And unlike older Americans
who have seen more presidencies in their lifetimes and have had the chance to see the impact of
more presidents firsthand, younger Americans have not experienced as many circumstances
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where the identity of the president matters. Instead, they will be more primed to think about the
Institution and the difficulty to really change anything.
Congress/Government Levels
Modern public opinion regarding Congress can take many forms. There is a wide variety of
subtopics that can be focused on. The topics that best match the Antifederalist concerns are those
that concentrate on approval ratings of the entirety of Congress vs. a person’s
representatives/senators. These are imperfect metrics but will both contribute toward looking at
the core concerns presented by Antifederalists.
Fenno’s Paradox is the classical explanation for how people compare Congress to
congresspeople. Key to this theory is that people “apply different standards of judgment, those
that we apply to the individual being less demanding than those we apply to the institution”
while simultaneously congresspeople prioritize their constituency and reelection (Fenno). This
emphasis on reelection is key. This means that members tend to spend the bulk of their time on
constituency relations and arguable not as much time on the legislative process as they should.
But also, “they [congresspeople] re-enforce our unfavorable judgments about the institution” in
order to promote themselves (Fenno). They simply would not win reelection by going against
consistency views on the institution, so this results in them perpetuating the negative perception
while allowing themselves to be contrasted with it.
Other scholars look more at the reasoning for why this phenomenon occurs. Parker and
Davidson recognized that domestic policy, foreign policy, and the “pace of the legislative
process” are key in approval ratings for Congress. These issues though, as systematically seen
negatively. It seems that the most salient issues just happen to be those that create negative
opinions of the institution. People lay the task of solving these national problems, and more, on
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Congress and when they do not do that it reflects extremely poorly, even if it is not the fault of
Congress (Parker and Davidson 54-56, 59). People are generally more willing to forgive
individual members in this case than the institution. This may be because they recognize that
stalemate and inactivity is not the fault of any one person, but it could also be a form of cognitive
dissonance where a person does not want to admit that the person they voted for is part of the
problem.
In contrast, people tend to evaluate congresspeople as individuals, not on the basis of them
doing their job. Public opinion surveys will only ask people about their approval/view of their
district’s representative or their senators. This automatically leads people to think about the more
personal connection they have to these officials than they do with the entirety of Congress.
Parker and Davidson showed that “evaluations of representatives tend to be based upon
constituency service provided the district and the personal attributes of incumbent” and policy is
rarely used when evaluating individuals (Parker and Davidson 56). This makes sense considering
the closer connection people have to their representatives and individual senators. Even if this is
an illusion, it stands to reason that people would see their representatives as a member of their
community and thus have more pride and protective instinct over their reputation as opposed to
Congress or other representatives.
Political polarization is also a necessary component. General agreement centers around the
idea that partisan conflict within Congress is detrimental to public confidence in Congress
(Harbridge and Malhotra 494). Confidence in and approval of Congress are different measures,
but it stands to reason that if the public has low confidence in the institution, then they would not
approve of it. The only group where this may not be true is within strong partisans in the
electorate. They would not want to have as much bipartisanship and would not see partisan
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gridlock in such a negative light. If anything, this would incentivize congresspeople to follow the
lead of strong partisans and not engage in bipartisanship (Harbridge and Malhotra 495). Living
in the current age of decreasing reasons to be bipartisan, this trend is not surprising, yet sheds
some light on the view of the median voter who would be more toward the center.
This literature is more subtly connected to the exact variable that will be examined. This
research will focus on options of local vs. state vs. the federal government(s) and while there is a
lack of literature explicitly on these areas, literature can be extrapolated to the context. If people
tend to evaluate congresspeople better than Congress because of their distance from them and the
consideration of personhood, it stands to reason that this might apply to different levels of
government as well. People can identify more with and have more involvement with their local
government than state government and state government than the federal government. The
further away that government gets from an individual, like Congress vs. congresspeople, the
lower and evaluation could get. This could have many motivations, but the ability to see the
people in that sector of government as individuals from their community instead of just cogs in
the federal machine is important.
Antifederalist literature tells us that they would envision people as preferring government
closer to them as their interests would be better understood and protected. This also connects to
the idea that a large republic cannot be governed the same way. H4 asserts that among all
participants there will be increasingly favorable views for government as the sector of
government becomes closer to their everyday lives i.e., local government is more favorable than
state government, and state government is more favorable than the federal government. This will
be particularly true for those who are younger. This hypothesis is jointly motivated by the
Antifederalist literature as well as public opinion literature that tells us that “younger people tend
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to more positive about government” (Section 2: Demographics and American Values). While
this means that their overall assessments of local, state, and the federal government should
theoretically be higher, it could also mean that there is an expectation that they would be mor
positive than other age categories about the group they prefer. They also have not had the same
amount of time as the other age categories to become cynical about all forms of government.
Electoral College
The Electoral College is a proxy for the difficulty to change the Constitution. Recently, it has
become an increasingly salient issue in public consciousness and the news media, but this
dissatisfaction with the presidential election system dates back to its conception at the
Constitutional Convention. Discussion about presidential elections was put on hold until all other
parts of the Constitution had been agreed upon and was described as being “rushed and sloppy”
(Foley 27). This is due to the great levels of disagreement that this issue caused. Nobody wanted
state delegates to walk out of the discussion entirely because of this issue. It was, and continues
to be, undeniably important, but was not worth sacrificing the entire Constitution over. This
resulted in a system that was composed entirely of compromise, little federal regulation in terms
of electors and enforcement, and ultimately left nobody entirely happy.
The history of the Electoral College is a complex one, but uniquely, it is one of the few
United States systems that has had minimal overhaul. Fundamentally, the system evolved from
the belief that “people were not qualified to choose the president, because they would be ignorant
of candidates or because they would be influenced by demagogic leaders or because they would
usually vote for someone from their own state” and as such “a national legislature should elect
the national executive” (Johnson 13, 16). This is more understandable in the 1780 context than it
is today. Very few people had the extra time to dedicate to political involvement and knowledge.
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Mostly elites were involved since they had servants, laborers, and slaves doing the work that
often would occupy the time of the lower classes. These elites are also the type of people that
would want their interests protected and would end up being electors in the Electoral College.
Each state had their own system for picking electors, but it would always be well connected and
wealthy elites (Foley 2). This, however, was one reason why some Antifederalists opposed the
system and therefore saw the Constitution as unacceptable. Samuel Chase, for example, opposed
the Constitution because “the president will not be chosen by the people immediately” (Chase
qtd. in Johnson 51). He saw this as being undemocratic and essentially allowing the aristocracy
to choose the president without input from the masses and essentially allow him to become a
“elected king” (Johnson 54).
The evolution of the Electoral College at the Constitutional Convention can be best explained
by providing a brief timeline of the debates that occurred. On June 2, James Wilson of
Pennsylvania proposed that states be made into districts and the people vote within these districts
to choose the electors who would then cast ballots for the presidency (Johnson 21). This is not an
entirely unfamiliar idea to modern Americans although it is obviously not the winning proposal.
The Convention reiterated the need for election by “national legislature” on July 26.
Interestingly, they also voted for a seven-year terms with no eligibility for a reelection (Johnson
26). The largest part of negotiation occurred between August 31st and September 4th when “a
committee consisting of one member from each of the attending eleven states, recommended
what became… the institution we know today is the Electoral College” (Johnson 31).
Issues arose almost immediately. Double balloting, or “each elector [being] constitutionally
required to vote for two candidates without distinguishing which candidate was preferred for
president and which for vice president” showed the flaw in not requiring the distinguishing
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between candidates (Johnson 80). It inadvertently resulted in situations, such as the election of
1824, where no candidate got the majority of the votes. The Framers also did not predict the rise
of political parties. This resulted in several issues quickly arising: (1) double balloting resulted in
unpredictable “electoral anomalies” such as the tie between Burr and Jefferson in 1800, (2) a
president and vice president of different parties, (3) the potential for the intended vice-president
to end up being president if enough minority party electors voted for him as their second choice
(Johnson 88-89). Fundamentally, the Founders saw the Electoral College originally as purely a
nominating body and believed it would be difficult to get a majority of elector votes (Johnson
143). However, this was untrue and as a result, it did not work as intended.
The Electoral College did not last long, though, before it was changed by the 12th
Amendment. Following the win of Thomas Jefferson against Aaron Burr the 12th Amendment
required that all sequent presidential elections be carried out with clear presidential and vicepresidential candidates. This means that electors would have to designate who they were voting
for for each office as opposed to the Constitutional system where electors did not differentiate
between their two votes. While this change was certainly motivated by “the Republicans’ desire
to redesign the Electoral College to assure Jefferson’s victory in 1804” the party also “continued
to believe that the very survival of the Republic was at stake” (Foley 29). Having such a major
change early on in the history of the country should have signaled that there might be problems
with the system later on. Any electoral system was unlikely to be perfect, but considering that
this is still the method in effect over 200 years later, it is noteworthy that there has been no other
major alteration.
In 1828, after the election of Andrew Jackson, plurality winner takes all election systems
became the dominant method in the states. This meant that a person could win a state’s electoral
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votes simply by getting a plurality of the popular vote (Foley 50). this changed made under his
presidency is interesting considering he was awarded the presidency by the House of
Representatives and only received a plurality of the national popular vote himself (Foley 60).
The historical implications are interesting to consider. If Jackson had not been elected in this way
would the system of changed? Would it have changed later? What other ways might it have
evolved These questions can be asked for every election and are important to ask. Yet, this
change in particular would possibly be seen by the Antifederalists as taking away what little
public input already existed.
This lack of change is certainly not due to perfection. Scholars generally agree that there
have been at least three times that the Electoral College has resulted in the winner of the
presidency not winning the majority-of-majorities that the Founders intended. These are the
elections of 1844, 1884, and 2000 (Foley 49). The 2016 election is also seen as one where the
legitimacy of the Electoral College System was thrown into disarray given being another
instance where the Electoral College winner won less of the popular vote (Johnson 103). These
metrics are of course imperfect and there are certainly other elections that could fit into this
category. That highlights the number of problematic elections as opposed to highlighting an issue
with the scholarship.
More so, while the President Biden did win a majority-of-majorities in 2020, and technically
the system worked as intended, “the 2020 election showed that the traditional bias of the
Electoral College toward the election results in battleground states could be taken to a whole new
level of political mendacity, frivolous litigation, raw political pressure, and attempted
unconstitutional action” (Johnson 131). While these are not issues inherent to the Electoral
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College, they are symptoms of larger issues with the current state of American Politics and the
way that such an open-ended system can fall victim to political circumstances.
As such, it stands to reason that Antifederalists would take issue with the inability to change
the electoral college after so many failures. While it may seem that over the course of more than
two centuries there has only been a handful of questionable elections, those elections have ended
up being majorly consequential. At a bare minimum the questioning of presidential legitimacy
has result in partisan issues and debate and at worse the electoral outcome has had a major
impact on the overall direction of the country. The Antifederalists would see this amount of
power being taken away from the people and put into the hands of the elite electors. They would
see the election of president as more than a game of politics that is to be played by a few,
especially when the masses think they are making the choice. While this may be closer to the
modern reality of the electoral college, this was certainly not the case historically.
Taking public opinion literature into account, a hypothesis becomes clear. H5: Support for
the Electoral College is a purely partisan decision with no difference based on age, education,
and sex across the parties. This is based in the 2018 moment that these surveys were taken
following the 2016 election. It has been found that “source cues, the political actors behind a
policy issue, play an influential role in shaping public opinion” (Nicholson 52). As such,
Democrats would be primed to think about Clinton’s loss despite winning the popular vote and
Republicans would think about how the Electoral College is the reason Trump won the
presidency. Further, there is the consideration that out-party cues are more impactful than inparty cues (Nicholson 64). This means that Democrats would be looking at Republican
commentary and forming opinions the opposite of what they are hearing, and vice versa. This
combination of factors means that partisan identity and the impact of the Electoral College on
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their party would be crucial to the opinion of the Electoral College. There are Democrats and
Republicans of all ages, education levels, and both sexes, but with the existing literature that
looks at the roles of these factors, none is likely to play as strong a role in this situation as
partisanship.
Methodology
In order to assess the prevalence of Antifederalist beliefs in modern day America, existing
public opinion polling will be utilized. This data will come from iRoper, a public opinion polling
database compiled by Cornell University. This allows pollsters to upload their surveys,
questions, results, and raw data if they choose to include it. They have over 800,000 surveys and
23,000 data sets available for use. Prior to selecting data sets, a set of requirements was created
in order to assure quality data was used for this project. First, the survey had to have raw data
available. This automatically reduced the number of surveys by a substantial amount but having
the raw data will allow a deeper dive into the data and allow me to run regressions using
demographic data to see if there is any correlation between belief and demographics. That feeds
into the second requirement, having at least a couple demographic questions available. This will
vary from survey to survey but at least asking about ideology and/or political affiliation will
allow some sort of connection to be made to certain demographics. The more information the
better, but this is a second priority to the quality of the questions asked. Third, the surveys should
be from a high quality, trustworthy source. This will not be a difficult quality to meet given the
database being used, but it is a necessary set to assure quality. Finally, the questions themselves
need to be adequate. They need to be worded in a non-leading way, have a variety of answer
choices, and most importantly, get to the heart of exactly the topic of concern. It is also
important that each survey covers multiple topics of interest. There needs to be a reasonable
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number of surveys to work with, with 2 being ideal, however, it is also important to cover all
topics given that different surveys focus on different content.
Selected Surveys
Two surveys are being utilized as data sources. Both are comprehensive and from Pew
Research Center. This means that they cover an extensive amount of topics (not all of which are
relevant to this study), have large sample sizes, and provide in depth demographic information.
The first survey is called the American Trends Panel Wave 32. It was conducted between
February 26, 2018 and March 11, 2018 and was a national sample with 6,251 participants. The
survey was conducted online and asked a total of 97 questions in addition to demographic
questions. This survey will be used for questions referencing nationalism and the rural-urban
divide. The second survey is the March 2018 Political Survey conducted between March 7, 2018
and March 14, 2018. This was also a national survey, but it was over telephone. This resulted in
a much smaller sample at 1,466 participants. However, there was a 4.3% and 5.6% response rate
(depending on the type of phone). This is important since it shows that a larger sample size was
the goal, but telephone interviews are notoriously difficult to have high response rates. There
were 59 content questions in addition to demographic questions. This survey will provide data
for the presidency, congress, a couple questions about nationalism, and the electoral college.
Data Analysis
All data analysis was conducted within the statistical computing programming language R. A
couple clarifications are in order. First, every question of interest involved some recoding. This
was done to make the data more digestible and intuitive as well as making the data easier for R
to process in a seamless way. For example, all data was originally categorical and need to be
made numeric. This involved recoding the lowest response to be “0” and increase in number as
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the categories advanced. This allowed averages to be calculated, bar graphs to be made, and
regressions to be run. Secondly, the partisanship, sex, age, and education variables were recoded
to create binaries, or as close as possible in the case of age. This allowed accuracy in the
regression analysis that would not have been possible if the data was left raw.
Data and Findings
Prior to conducting a deep look into the data, it is necessary to situate the time at which these
surveys took place. Both were taken at the beginning of 2018. This means that it is essential to
remember that it was a year into Donald Trump’s presidency and the political situation in the
United States was particularly fraught. Having Trump as president is a massive confounding
variable and that needs to be mentioned. As will be seen, there are partisan trends with many of
the survey results and it is necessary to consider the impact of the Trumpian politics. Trump was
a shock to the American political system and motivated both Democrats and Republicans to hold
strong in or sometimes change their opinions. He accentuated the divides between the parties and
as such it is necessary examine responses under the control of party.
Nationalism
In the case of nationalism, the Y-axis scales differ between the two types of data. First, there
is the data concerning federal aid. This includes whether respondents believed a certain
community type received a fair share of aid, indicating rural-consciousness attitudes. This
requires an extrapolation of the term. Rural residents, in this context, would see themselves as
separate from suburban and urban communities. And as such, would evaluate themselves as
consistently underfunded, and thus left behind. While suburban and urban residents might also
share this view of rural areas, they will have different perspectives of their own communities,
showing that rural residents view themselves differently than others view themselves. The scale
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ranges from 0 to 2 where a 0 is less than their fair share, 1 is the correct amount of aid, and 2,
where a community gets too much federal aid. The graphs display average answers.
Trends in rural consciousness attitudes are demonstrated in Figure 1.1. Red bars represent the
attitudes of rural community residents, green bars represent of suburban community residents,
and blue bars represent urban community residents. The average response indicates no group
thinks any community is receiving too much federal aid, regardless of membership. This could
indicate that people tend to lean toward the idea that the federal government does not do enough.
Out of the 9 possible combination options for resident type and community type, only 4 groups
see aid as being adequate as indicated by an average above 1. These groups are rural residents
asked about suburban aid, rural residents asked about urban aid, urban residents asked about
suburban aid, and suburban residents asked about urban aid. This shows a few crucial trends.
First, no resident said that their own community was receiving the correct amount of aid.
The closest group that comes to an average of 1 is suburban residents, but they do not quite reach
the threshold. This shows that there is a level of bias in these responses and people will always
view their own community as underfunded regardless of what the situation might be. Second,
nobody believes that rural communities are adequately funded. This stands out since (1) it is a
very stark difference between assessments of suburban and urban aid, (2) both suburban and
urban residents said the other group’s community is very slightly overfunded yet lean toward
being adequately and fairly funded, and (3) there is an ascending order in the average the farther
away a person gets form living in a rural community. To focus in on the last point, rural residents
think rural communities are more underfunded than suburban residents do than urban residents
do. This indicates that a degree of separation from a given community’s lifestyle or needs has
some influence on responses. Yet, suburban and urban communities, though, are similar enough
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that there is little meaningful difference between them. The main focus is the difference in rural
attitudes versus the other two groups.
Fair Share of Federal Aid
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Figure 1.1
Typically, data of this nature must be situated in its demographic context. However, this is
not the case here given the massive similarity to the data broken down by partisanship.1
Partisanship, though is still important to consider as trends within each party are likely to be
different and party can act as a control. The one central difference is that there are more
categories with an average above 1. These categories are urban Republicans when asked about
suburban and urban aid. Other than these groups, it is the same as with the full sample of both
Democrats and Republicans. Independents and non-identifiers were surveyed as well, but they

1

Sample Sizes:
Democrats: Rural (510), Suburban (981), Urban (596)
Republicans: Rural (778), Suburban (826), Urban (193)
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were not of focus and likely would have had samples too small to draw any meaningful
conclusions.
The groups also look very similar across party, but with a couple important distinctions.
These differences occurred mostly within the urban respondents: (1) Urban Democrats think that
rural communities get more of a fair share than urban Republicans, (2) Urban Democrats have a
higher average for suburban aid than Urban Republicans, indicating that Democrats think they
get slightly more than their fair share while Republicans lean more toward the perspective of the
right amount of aid, and (3) there is a massive difference in urban views of urban aid across party
with Democrats having an average around 0.50, indicating they do not think urban communities
get enough aid, while Republicans have an average above 1, indicating they think urban
communities get slightly too much aid.
This data works toward supporting H1 that everybody will see their own community as
underfunded and be less compassionate about the funding of other communities. Interestingly,
though, everybody generally sees rural areas as underfunded and rural communities are more
critical of suburban and urban aid levels. While it was not hypothesized that everybody would
feel this way about rural areas, it aligns with the Antifederalist idea that a democratic republic in
a country with such large and diverse interests would not work. Somebody would always feel
ignored and left behind, and the data supports the idea that this is rural communities. Even
outside of rural areas, rural areas as seen, to some extent, as left behind. This illustrates how
strong this feeling is; for those outside of rural areas to see this phenomenon, it must be an
extremely strong phenomenon. In this context, the phenomenon of rural consciousness is
understandable. If you felt isolated, underfunded, and fundamentally misunderstood, it makes
sense that the identity causing this would be the main lens through which you see the world.
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Education is the first demographic factor that responses will be divided by. In this case, and
for education throughout the paper, respondents with less than a college degree were coded as
“0” and those with a college degree or advanced degree were coded as “1”. The following data
divides the participant responses based on this coding. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 depict responses for
Democrats with less than a college degree and a college degree or higher, respectively. They
contain almost identical trends and values. This is, frankly, somewhat surprising as education
level would be expected to have a visual difference on perceptions of federal aid. However, this
does not rule out the potential for statistical significance. There are some differences and, in most
categories for both education levels, people think less than the fair share of aid is being given.
This is for all rural aid categories, suburban views of suburban aid for both education levels,
urban views of urban aid for both education levels, and suburban views of urban aid for those
with at least college degrees. This reinforces the idea that a person will almost always think that
their own community is not receiving a fair share of what they are owed.
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Examining Republicans by education level, there are not such extensive similarities. The
rural aid and suburban aid categories all look very similar regardless of education level. The
approximate averages for each community type are slightly different, as would be expected, but
they are very similar, and the trend are nearly identical. What is different is the urban view of
urban aid. Republicans without a college degree who are living in an urban area have an average
score under one indicating that the average respondent does not think urban areas are receiving a
fair share of aid. The average, though, is just below 1, so these urban Republicans with lower
education levels are close to thinking the fair share threshold is being met. However, when a
Republican with more than a college degree lives in an urban area, they have an average
response over 1. This indicates that they think the area is, on average, receiving a fair amount of
aid, but a fair number of respondents think the aid level is too high. This is interesting since it is
rare for a resident to think their own community to receiving too much. Yet, if any group would
say this, it makes sense that it is Republicans who tend to be more opposed to federal aid overall
and would prefer lower levels of government spending (Jones). But they do think that rural
communities do not receive enough aid so perhaps they would prefer reallocation of funds to
cutting spending entirely. Also, a college degree could indicate a level of political
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knowledge/civic literacy higher than those without a college degree that would contribute to
these attitudes.
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Sex is an extremely interesting variable to look at as well. Male respondents were coded as a
“0” and female respondents were coded as “1” (throughout all the data). This is because it is
nearly impossible to distinguish between the data for men and women (within each party)
without provided context. This is much like the trend for Democrats divided by education level.
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 display Democrat women and Democrat men, respectively. The graphs are
nearly identical. There are slight differences, but they are shockingly similar. The two most
evident differences are the urban resident views of rural and urban aid, but comparatively to
other variable differences, these are minor. As well, both graphs display data that aligns with the
overall graph of Democrat data in Figure 1.2, described above. This is not surprising given how
the sex distinguished graphs look the same, but it leads to the preliminary conclusion, before
regression analysis, that sex is likely not going to be significant for Democrats for any type of aid
share.
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For Republicans divided by sex, the overall trends are similar, but the values of the data
points are different. Thus, the trends in each graph have different implications. Looking at
Republican women, the average value for all urban aid and suburban aid categories for urban and
rural communities are all approximately 1 or higher. This means every community type think
urban areas receive almost exactly their fair share of aid as well as rural and urban community
residents thinking suburban areas receive their fair share of aid. This aligns with the findings for
Republican men in Figure 1.11. The only difference is that Republican men living in rural areas
believe that suburban and urban communities get slightly more than their fair share, as indicated
by averages solidly above 1. There is also a solid consensus for all Republicans, regardless of
respondent sex and community type that rural aid is far below the fair share threshold.
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The age variable is also divided by Democrats and Republicans. The coding for this variable
was slightly more complicated with four categories:18-29 years-old, 30-49, 50-64, and 65+,
coded 0 through 3, respectively. The volume of graphs compared to the other variables, though,
is due to each age category requiring its own graph. As such, Figures 1.12-1.15 are Democrats
and Figures 1.16-1.19 are Republicans. Both sets of graphs are in ascending age order and are
clearly marked.
Beginning with the Democrats figures 1.12-1.15 look extremely similar. Consistent is that
regardless of age or community type, all averages indicate that rural areas receive less than their
fair share. Suburban and urban residents, regardless of all, also think their respective
communities do not receive enough aid. This is in line with Democratic trends across the other
demographic variable examined. Another important trend of note is the consistent idea among
rural residents in all age groups that suburban and urban communities receive slightly too much
aid. This is indicated by all but 1 of these categorical averages being over a 1. This trend also
applies to urban views of suburban communities and suburban views of urban communities. As
such, it may be the case that when divided by age, Democratic respondents simply think rural
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communities as well as their own get too little aid and the other (suburban or urban) gets too
much. This may seem like a very simplistic picture, but it is indicated by the data.
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Switching to Republicans, the trends are not as clear cut. There are certainly similarities
among age groups, but it is not across all of them evenly. First, the trend is still present that every
community type thinks that rural communities are federally underfunded. It is also consistent that
rural communities think that rural areas are the most underfunded. For 18-29 and 30-49-yearolds, urban communities have the highest average score which indicates that they are closest to
thinking that rural areas are highly funded. This may show that for these ages, distance from the
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lifestyle you live in may play a role in the assessment of aid share. As well, rural residents in all
age categories have an average score more than 1 for suburban and urban aid showing they think
these areas are both slightly overfunded. In every category except 65+ the average is also higher
for urban aid indicating rural residents think that urban areas are more overfunded than suburban
areas.
For suburban and urban residents, the average opinion does differ for each age. Suburban
residents in all age groups have an average assessment of suburban aid below 1, indicating they
think their own community is underfunded. This is in line with previous data. Interestingly,
young suburban residents in the 18-29 age category thinks that urban communities are
overfunded but 50-64 and 65+year-olds think that urban areas are underfunded, and the 30-49
category has an average of approximately 0.97 showing that they are incredibly close to thinking
the threshold for fair aid is met. This goes against previous trends of thinking communities other
than your own are overfunded. Urban residents in nearly every age they think that both suburban
and urban areas receive more than their fair share as indicated by an average over 1. There are
two exceptions to this: urban Republicans aged 50-64-years-old assessing suburban aid and
urban Republicans aged 30-49-years-old assessing urban aid. This are the two cases where the
average is less than 1 showing that they do not think this community receives the correct amount,
never mind too much, federal aid. No other group says that their own community is overfunded.
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Regressions were conducted on the data to see if there are non-random relationships between
the independent and dependent variables. It will show if the trends in the graphs are meaningful.
For the ease of understanding, discussion of the regression results needs to be separated based on
aid type. First, rural aid levels from the perspective of all community types and both parties.
Then the discussion will progress to suburban aid and urban aid (Figure 1.20)
The first significance test run was that of community type and if it influences views of rural
aid share. Democrats and Republicans both have statistically significant relationships for
suburban and urban residency when they are compared against rural residency (p-values <0.01).
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This means that there is a significant difference between rural residents and others when
assessing rural aid share. All of these groups have positive coefficients showing that suburban
and urban residents that are Democrats and Republicans are more likely to assess rural aid share
as being “fair” instead of “unfair”. Although, neither party has significance related to age and
Republicans do not have significance related to education. This demonstrates that age does not
impact either party’s assessment and education level does not impact Republican assessments.
For Democrats both sex and education level have p-values <0.01, showing there is an important
connection. This means, functionally, that having a college degree as well as sex play a nonrandom role in Democrat assessments of rural aid. Those with college degrees and men will have
higher average responses. Republicans do have significance related to sex at a p-value of
0.011277, which is important and shows sex plays a role for Republicans, but not as strongly as
for Democrats.

Figure 1.20
Progressing to views of suburban aid, there is statistical significance related to Republicans
that live in suburban areas (p-value <0.01). This shows that there is a difference between rural
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assessments and suburban assessments of suburban aid. The negative coefficient implies that
suburban Republicans think that their community’s aid level is less fair than how rural residents
would assess it. In other words, rural residents are more likely to say that suburban areas get too
much aid. There is no significance for urban residents. For Democrats, there is significance for
both suburban (p-value <0.01) and urban residents (p-value <0.05), indicating a meaningful
difference between them and rural Democrats. However, the coefficient for suburban residents in
negative and the urban coefficient is positive. Practically, this means that, like suburban
Republicans, rural residents are more likely than suburban residents to say that suburban aid is
too high, but urban residents are more likely than rural residents to say that suburban aid is too
high.
Interestingly, views of suburban aid share show statistically significant relationships to age
for both Democrats and Republicans with p-values of 0.00143 and 0.0229, respectively. As well,
both have negative coefficients, indicating that the younger a respondent is, the higher their
evaluation is of aid share. Younger people are more likely to share aid is higher than it should be.
This is unlike rural aid where age was not significant for either group. This implies that there is
something different about views of rural aid and suburban aid. Perhaps this has to do with the
amount of time being politically active and an evolution of one’s perspective of the needs of
suburban communities. Democrats, though, have a stronger significance level for education, with
a p-value <0.01. This shows that having a college degree is a more important factor in
evaluations of suburban aid share than age, sex, or area of residence. Republicans do not have
significance related to sex or education, showing that age is the only non-random influential
variable.
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Finally, there is the regressions related to urban aid share. All four conditions (combinations
of party ID and suburban/urban residency) are statistically significant. Suburban Republicans
have a p-value <0.05 while the other three groups have p-values <0.01. These indicate extremely
strong relationships and non-random differences between rural Democrats and Republicans
compared to suburban and urban Democrats and Republicans. As well, all four of these groups
have negative coefficients. This shows that rural residents are more likely than any of these
groups to say that urban areas receive too much aid. At a minimum, they will think that urban aid
is closer to “fair” than suburban and urban residents do. However, this also means that they
would be more likely to say that urban areas are overfunded.
Democrats, in fact, only have one other variable that is significant and that is education, with
a p-value of 0.0365, which is quite low. This indicates that there is evidence that having a college
degree is connected to having a lower average evaluation of aid share. Republicans, when
evaluating urban aid share, have high levels of significance related to both sex and education.
Both variables result in p-values <0.01, showing there is extremely strong, non-random
connections between each variable and the views of Republicans. The negative regression
coefficient implies that men (coded as “0” vs. the “1” for women) have average higher
evaluations of urban aid share and are thus more likely to think there is too much aid. The
positive coefficient for education though, indicates that higher education levels are correlated
with higher average evaluations of aid. This contrasts with Democrats. Unlike Democrats, there
seems to be no consistency among the three types of aid share in terms of significance to certain
dependent variables.
Altogether, this data shows a general support for H1: Residents of rural communities,
regardless of demographics, will view rural communities as underfunded. As well, they will see
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suburban and urban communities as being overfunded while those residents will see the level of
aid as more fair This trend will be strengthened as age increases due to the amount of time that
people have dealt with the consequences of over/underfunding. Where it falls short is the concept
that age plays a major role. There are situations, with suburban aid levels, where age is shown to
be important. However, there is strong evidence that, with variation within aid type, party, sex,
and education play a large role in the assessment of federal aid share, overall. Yet, the graphs do
show that that there are differences between rural and non-rural communities with strong
statistical relationships attesting to this point. This shows that there is something different about
the types of people that live in these different places and is in line with what the Antifederalists
would have expected. It might be that rural consciousness and the overall group identity to where
one lives is an influence in how federal aid distribution is assessed. It could be another variable
concerning, job type or income level, for example. While this is a route that future research could
take, it does show that there is at least a difference between raw data and the data controlled for
by age, sex, and education.
United States Stance in the World
The second metric by which to measure nationalism to asking how the United States
compares to other counties on seven various measures: political system, science, universities,
economy, health care, military, public education, and the overall standard of living. This was
scored on a scale of 0 to 3 where 0 means the US is below average, 1 is average, 2 is above
average, and 3 is the best in the world. The average response is displayed in the graphs on the yaxis.
Figure 2.1 shows the average across all the questions for each party. There is a stark divide
between the parties. Democrats have an average of approximately 1.35 indicating that they think
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the United States is generally closer to “average” than “above average” than other countries. This
symbolizes relatively low nationalism. Contrastingly, Republicans have an average response of
about 1.80 which puts them much closer to the “above average” category but still broadly in the
“below average” group.
This difference is largely attributable to questions where there is massive disagreement
between the parties (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Essentially, this was all questions except the one about
universities where the party averages were basically even. In every other question though,
Republicans had a higher valuation of the United States. This was especially true for health care,
which Democrats consider “below average” and Republicans consider halfway between
“average” and “above average”. Evaluations for the political system and economy are also
massively different with Republicans and Democrats being in different categories, on average.
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These differences between Republicans and Democrats results in party being hugely
statistically significant at a p-value < 0.01. This makes it clear that at a bare minimum, party
identification plays a large role on evaluations of the Unites States and therefore nationalism
(Figure 2.19). Given the negative coefficient, this indicates that Republicans have higher
evaluations of the United States’ stance in the world.
Education is crucial given the hypothesis focusing on the impact of a college education.
Figure 2.4 shows that Republicans, regardless of education level, have almost equal views of the
United States. Democrats with a college education or higher have a better average view of the
United States. Republicans also have a much higher view than Democrats overall. Examining
each of the seven questions, Democrats with college degrees or higher have better views of the
United States on every metric (Figure 2.5 and 2.6). Some differences between the groups are
greater than others, but there is not a single instance when those with than a college education
have better views of the US stance in the world. Republicans, contrastingly, show that each
group has differing views of most topics, but they average out to be about the same. For
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example, college educated Republicans have higher average views of the political system,
military, and public education (Figure 2.7). Yet, Republicans without a college education have
better views of US universities and health care. This is in support of H2: which anticipated party
being the dominate lens that Republicans used to evaluate the United States yet goes against the
prediction of Democrats with less education having more favorable views.
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For sex, though, the trend is reversed. Figure 2.9 shows that while Republicans, regardless of
sex, still have a higher average view of the United States’ stance in the world, there is a sex
difference for Republicans and not one for Democrats. Democrats had mixed results for each
question. Females had noticeably higher averages for scientific achievement, economy, public
education, and the US standard of living. Yet, males were considerably higher on their
evaluations of universities and health care (Figures 2.10 and 2.11). Worth mentioning, though, is
that both males and females had extremely low evaluation of healthcare in the United States
compared to the rest of the world. Both averages were just above 0.5 indicating that they both
think the United States is firmly below average. Republicans, contrastingly, had a clear trend
based on sex. As seen in Figures 2.12 and 2.13, females had higher average evaluations of the
United States in every category, except the economy. Some categories had bigger differences
than others, such as the military where there was a larger gap between the sexes than universities.
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The final demographic variable is age and is seen in Figure 2.14. Republicans, once again,
have an overall average evaluation across all age categories. Republicans all have an average
above or around approximately 1.65, indicating that the average Republican, in every age group,
tends to think that the United States is just average yet approaching above average. This average
is highest amongst the youngest age category of 18-29 with the oldest category of 65+ being a
close second. Democrats, in comparison, have a very different trend. The 18-29 age group is well
below an average of 1 showing that they think the United States is below average compared to
other countries. All the other age groups are clustered together around approximately a 1.3
showing that they think the United States is solidly average.
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Looking at Democrats for each question, it becomes clear very quickly why 18–29-year-olds
have such a lower average than the other age groups. The first factor is that in every question,
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there is a large difference between their average evaluation and the other age groups that tend to
cluster closer together (Figures 2.15 and 2.16). in fact, it places their average in an entirely
separate category most of the time. In all but one question, they assess the United States as below
average. Also, the average is missing for 18–29-year-olds for the questions of economy and
health care. For the question regarding the economy, this is due to more non-responses than
answers to the question being provided. This meant that a reliable mean could not be calculated.
However, for health care, the average response was simply zero; every 18–29-year-old asked
about the United States health care system assess it as globally below average.
Similarly, looking at individual question averages for Republicans, it becomes clear why 1829-year-olds have a higher overall assessment of the United States (Figures 2.17 and 2.18). In 4
of the 7 questions, they have a higher average than any of the other age categories, and like
Democrats, tend to be more closely clustered together. For 3 of the 4 questions, they have an
average response of 3 which is as high as possible and indicates that every 18–29-year-old
Republican surveyed thinks the United States is the best in the world for universities, economy,
and health care. They do, however, have a mean of 0 for public education, indicating every
person every 18–29-year-old Republican surveyed thinks the United States public education
system is below average. This along with the below average score of 1 given for standard of
living explains why the overall average response for this age group is not higher than it is in
Figure 2.14. It is necessary to note that this 18–29-year-old sample size, though, is far too small
to draw any meaningful conclusion, yet it would be remiss not to point out this trend and explain
the lack of data on the graph.
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Interestingly, the regression analysis makes it clear that for Republicans there is no statistical
significance for sex and education and minimal statistical significance for age, at a p-value of
0.0558 (Figure 2.19). This shows that for Republicans, their evaluation of the United States, and
thus their nationalism, links back almost fully to their party identification. For Democrats, once
again, age is not a statistically significant variable, but sex and education level are, both with pvalues < 0.01. These are both very low p-values, with the sex coefficient being negative and the
education coefficient being positive. This means, practically, that males and more highly
educated Democrats have higher evaluations of the United States compared to other countries.
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This differentiates Democrats and Republicans showing that there is a more complicated
connection between Democrats and their nationalistic evaluations than there is for Republicans.
However, it is somewhat surprising that age is not more significant for Republicans or significant
at all for Democrats. When looking at the overall average responses for each age group, this
makes slightly more sense, but there are drastic differences when examining the data on a
question-by-question basis.

Figure 2.19
The data above provide support for most of Republicans with college degrees or advanced
degrees will have about the same view of the United States as do Republicans with a college
degree or less. For Democrats, those with less education will have a more favorable view of the
United States. However, for Democrats there will also be an age factor where younger
Democrats aged 18-29 will have a much lower view of the United States than any other age

60
group. Education is seen as not being a significant variable for republicans, which indicates there
is little difference in assessments of the United States based on education level. However, this
variable is significant for Democrats as hypothesized. Where the hypothesis is disproven is the
role of age for Democrats. There seems to be age differences in the survey answers, but age is
not statistically significant. In fact, sex is significant which was not foreseen.
Presidentialism
There is, quite frankly, a lack of public opinion polling that addresses views on the growth of
presidential power. People are not directly asked if they think the president has more power than
they used to. Instead, there are questions framed around the idea of whether they think it matters
who the president is. These data, while not a direct translation to the Antifederalist concern does
give valid insight. If respondents do not tend to think the identity of the president matters, then
they can be seen as more resigned to the fact that the president has certain powers, and anybody
would use them. This is more a reflection on the institution of the presidency instead of a
reflection on who the individual president is. The Antifederalists would think that the identity of
the president does not matter as the Institution creates a king-like figure no matter the person.
The Institution shapes the person instead of the person shaping the Institution. Findings aligning
with this outlook would indicate a modern agreement with Antifederalist concerns.
There was a total of five questions asked about a range of topics: mood in the US, national
security, personal life, economic health, US standing in the world. Each of these questions
referenced whether the identity of the president had a big impact on that topic. Answered ranged
from 0 to 2 where a 0 means that there is no difference in the identity of the president, a 1 means
there is some difference and a 2 represents that there is a big difference in the identity. These
averages are shown on the y-axis of the graphs.
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Beginning with the strictly partisan divide, it is interesting that when averaging the answers
across all the questions, the parties almost have an identical average (seen in Figure 3.1). This is
not necessarily expected, but when the data are divided among questions (Figures 3.2 and 3.3) it
becomes clear that opinion differs on issue and Figure 3.1 is deceiving. For example, Democrats
think presidential identity is more important for the mood in the US, their personal life, and US
standing in the world, but Republicans think it is important for national security and economic
health. This not surprising. During the Trump presidency, as seen in the literature review,
Democrats increasingly focused on social issues and Republicans focused on the economy and
security. While the survey questions did not ask about Trump, everybody was primed to think
about him since he was the current president and an incredibly divisive one at that. As well, all
average answers across the five questions had an average over 1, indicating that everybody
agreed presidential identity does make a difference. The averages over 1.5 show an especially
strong feeling that on those issues, presidential identity is incredibly important.
Figure 3.4 shows the regression output for party identity related to the average view of
presidential importance. As can be seen, party is not statistically significant and has an incredibly
high p-value of 0.892. This shows that there is a no connection between party and view of the
importance of presidential identity. This reinforces Figure 3.1 and shows that despite the
differences in individual questions, the overall averages make partisanship a non-factor. Yet,
given the average value for each party being a 1.5, this works to disprove H3 that states
presidential identity does not matter.
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In the case of education differences, there is a clear difference between Democrats and
Republicans. These can be seen in Figure 3.4, showing the overall trend of college educated
Democrats and Republicans with less than a college education but thinking that presidential
identity is more important than their counterparts. However, the differences between the in-party
educational categories are not very large when looked on at this graph that averages the five
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questions together. All groups think presidential identity makes a difference as they all have an
average around approximately 1.5.
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As such, it is necessary to examine the data by question for each party. First, looking at
Democrats (Figures 3.5 and 3.6) as all averages are over 1.0, and some even over 1.5,
presidential identity is seen as important regardless of education level. However, for 3 of the 5
questions, mood in the USA, national security, and economic health, college-educated
Democrats think presidential identity is more important with those with less than a college
education. For the other 2 questions, personal life and US standing in the world, the averages are
almost identical, but those with less than a college education have slightly elevated average
answers. For Republicans (Figures 3.7 and 3.8) these trends are entirely reversed. Like
Democrats, every question indicates that the president’s identity is important. However, for all
questions except that of the respondent’s personal life, those without a college education say the
identity is much more important. The gap between educational averages is larger across the
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Republican category than the Democrat category, indicating that education might be more
important for Republican evaluations
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Sex is the next demographic variable in question. Figure 3.9 shows that regardless of
question, sex seems to have a slight impact for Democrats, with males believing presidential
identity is more important than females, but it seems to have no impact for Republicans. All
groups though, believe that identity is very important with female Democrats having an average
just under 1.5 and the other 3 groups being at or above a 1.5. Looking at just Democrats, in
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Figures 3.10 and 3.11, men have a higher reported average answer across all questions except for
the one related to the mood in the US. The differences between male and female answers are
noticeable too, it is not a massive difference in any average, but there certainly is a difference
that has the potential to be statistically significant. Republican data, though, reinforces the idea
of no gender difference existing. In the national security category and personal life category, the
average answer is the same, men have a much higher answer for mood in the US, and women
have higher averages for the economic health and US standing in the world (Figures 3.12 and
3.13). However, these differences balance out to create the nearly identical overall average
shown in Figure 3.9.
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The final demographic variable is age. Figure 3.14 shows results of the five questions
averaged across age category and party. As can be seen, age is important to every category, but it
is noteworthy how the 18-29-year-old category for both parties seem to be an outlier. For
Democrats, 18–29-year-olds have an average response of 1 while the other 3 age categories are
all centers around approximately 1.5. While there is diversity in those categories, the lowest age
range stands out as having exceedingly low averages. This is also true for 18–29-year-old
Republicans, but to a lesser degree. Their average response is much closer to the other categories
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than it was for Democrats, but it is still noticeably lower, at approximately 1.3 instead of
approximately 1.5 like the other age groups.
Further examining why the youngest respondents have such low scores, 18–29-year-old
Democrats have much lower average responses than others for the questions of economic health,
US standing in the world, and impact on their personal life (Figure 3.15 and 3.16). This means
that they do not think the identity of the president matters in their categories as much as other age
groups do. The highest average among these 3 is a 1 which represents “some impact” so they
think the institution itself is more important than the individual holding the presidency. This
could be reflecting the pessimism of young people that anything within politics makes a
difference, and any one person can change anything.
Contrastingly, for young Republicans, their responses do not particularly stand out as low
when looking at each question. They have an average response of 2 for their assessments of
economic health and US standing in the world, signaling they think the president’s identity has a
big impact. This is countered though by their average response of 1 for national security and
their personal life. This stands out, but 50–64-year-olds have this exact same response, so it is
not as overly stark as for young Democrats who consistently answered lower than others. For
Republicans, age does not seem to have as clear of an impact as it does for Democrats, yet
Democrats do not have a very clear connection either.
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Finally, there is the regression analysis data for all three demographic variables. Figure 3.19
shows the regressions for Republicans and Democrats. As predicted, there is statistical
significance when education is considered. Republicans have a p-value of 0.0225 and Democrats
have a p-value of 0.00431. As well, the coefficients are of interest, being 0.20 and -0.17,
respectively. This shows that the magnitude of the relationship is about the same for both parties,
but the relationship between degree and non-degree holders runs in opposite direction.
Republican non-degree holders and Democrats degree holders are increasingly likely to say
presidential identity matters. The p-values for sex are also as expected with Republicans having a
non-significant p-value of 0.3001 and Democrats having a significant p-value of 0.00336 This
Democrat p-value along with the positive coefficient of 0.144 shows that Democratic women are
more likely than men to think presidential identity is important. With this p-value being lower
than that of education, it shows that sex has even more of an impact on importance of
presidential identity. Interestingly, despite the data differences in some for the age categories,
age is not statistically significant for either Republicans or Democrats, with p-values of 0.5467
and 0.78950, respectively.
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Figure 3.19
H3 (As presidential power has grown over time, the identity of the president will be seen as
having less of an. People have likely evolved to think that the Institution of the presidency is
more important than the President himself. This will be especially true for both Republicans and
Democrats with less than a college degree) was entirely unsupported by the data. People across
all groups saw the identity of the president to at least make somewhat of a difference. No group
had an overall average answer suggesting that the identity is not important at all. While there
were certain questions that may have leaned toward little difference, this is not nearly as strong a
response as hypothesized. Education was statistically significant for both Democrats and
Republicans, but it did not manifest as hypothesized. In fact, Republicans with less than a college
degree thought the identity of the president was more important than those with a college degree;
this goes entirely against the hypothesis. This results from this set of analyses do not support the
Antifederalist stance. While they may be correct that presidential power has grown and the
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president will become a de facto monarch, the people see the identity of the person being
influential in how the presidency is run. If people aligned with Antifederalist stance and saw all
presidents as being king-like in their ruling style, they would not see the identity of the president
as mattering.
Governmental Levels
To best assess feelings toward Congress, it was important to compare to other types of
government. There were questions regarding feelings toward the individual respondent’s state
government and local government as well as the federal government. All these questions were
worded identically besides replacing the section of government asked about. They were also all
scaled identically ranging from 0 to 3 where 0 represented a very unfavorable attitude, 1 meant
mostly unfavorable, 2 meant mostly favorable, and 3 meant very favorable. The graphs below
contain the data taken as the differences between local/state and state/federal. This will show the
preference (or disfavor) for local over state and state over federal governments.
First, Figure 4.1 depicts a purely partisan divide. As can be seen in the graph, all values are
positive, indicating that both Democrats and Republicans hold a preference for the closer section
of government to them. This means local government is preferred over state government, yet
state government is preferred over federal government. What stands out, though is the margin of
difference between the parties. Looking at local government, Republicans have a higher value
indicating a stronger local preference, than Democrats. It is not a large difference, but it is
present. Looking at state government versus federal government, Democrats have a substantially
larger preference for state government than republicans do. But it also stands out that both parties
prefer state over federal government more than they prefer local over state government. This
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could be the result of large-scale distaste for the federal government instead of strong feelings
about state government.
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There is limited statistical significance though, related to purely partisan differences. For the
local over state condition, there is no significance related to party, with a p-value of 0.568
(Figure 4.5). Yet for state over federal, there is strong statistical significance related to party,
with a p-value of 0.00038 and a positive coefficient (Figure 4.6). This positive coefficient means
that Democrats have more of a preference of state government over federal government than
Republicans do.
Examining preference by education and sex within each party is not as different from the
strict partisan divide as one might expect. Beginning with education level, as can be seen in
Figure 4.2, the trends look similar to Figure 4.1. Of note is the disposition of those with less than
a college education, regardless of party, to have a weaker preference for local and state
government. For Republicans this is strong when looking at the local versus state condition and
for Democrats it is a very large difference when looking at the state versus federal condition.
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Yet, education is not statistically significant for either party in either condition (Figures 4.5-4.6).
This shows that while there is some divergence in opinion, this difference cannot be definitively
linked to education level alone.
Looking at sex differentials in Figure 4.3, it looks incredibly similar to the results for
education. The main differences are that Republican women have a weaker preference for local
government and Republican men have a weaker preference for state government. While these
two analyses cannot be directly compared, it is interesting and worth nothing that the overall
trend seems to be the same: there is a stronger preference in both parties for the state over federal
versus local over state. Once again, though, nothing related to sex for either party or condition is
statistically significant.
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Age is the category that stands out, simply because of how different the graph looks. This is
the only category where there are negative values graphed, as seen in Figure 4.4. These indicate
that for those age/party combinations there is a preference for state government over local
government and federal government over state government. As well, these preferences are
stronger, in 2 out of the 3 cases, than all but 1 preference going the other way. This stands out
given the nature of the data in all other demographic categories. Focusing in on Republicans 1829 and 30-49, this is where the negative values appear. For local versus state, 18-29-year-olds
produce a value of approximately -0.5 while 30-49-year-olds have an average value of
approximately 1. This is massive difference between these two categories and unlike anything
else shown for two age categories, in the same party, that neighbor each other.
Interestingly, for Republicans 50-64-years-old, the category next to 30–49-year-olds, the
average drops drastically to under 0.25. This indicates that there is something unique about the
30-49 age category. Examining the same Republican 18-29 and 30-49 categories for state versus
federal, both categories produce negative values, approximately -0.7 and -0.3, respectively. This
shows that for 18–29-year-olds there is a stronger preference for federal government over state
government than there was for state government over local government. Also, the preference for
30–49-year-olds flipped entirely to a noteworthy negative preference, for federal government.
Yet, once again, there is no statistical significance for age in either party and either condition.
This leads to a possible inference that there is simply not enough of a sample size in each
category for significance to be drawn but using the same participant data for other topics did lead
to significance, so these results cannot be entirely dismissed.
Ideally, there would be a control variable related to area of residence. It is impossible to
ignore that this may play a role in preferences of government type, especially given the lack of
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explanation from age, sex, or education. For example, rural residents might be more comfortable
with their local governments as they are better understood by local governments. Linking back to
rural consciousness, they might see themselves as misunderstood by state and/or federal officials.
However, this data is not available in this data set and serves as a significant limitation

Figure 4.5

Figure 4.6

The overall findings related to this section are more difficult to concisely summarize. H4
predicted that among all participants there will be increasingly favorable views for government
as the sector of government becomes closer to their everyday lives i.e., local government is more
favorable than state government, and state government is more favorable than the federal
government. This will be particularly true for those who are older and/or have lower levels of
education. It is impossible to deny that this trend was found. Local governments and state
governments were consistently rated more favorably. However, no variable was found as an
explanation for this trend. Party, age, sex, and education were not statistically significant, except
for one case related to party. But even in this case, it was a weak significance value. This leaves
the major question of what causes this trend. More research clearly needs to be done as this trend
is unlikely to simply be random. There may be another demographic variable that explains it, or
it could simply be that closeness to the officials explains the preference.

77
Electoral College
The scale for these graphs is the simplest of these categories. A 1 indicates a preference for
amending the Constitution to change the Electoral College, and a 0 indicates a preference to
leave the Electoral College as is. This is due to the nature of the topic. Unlike the prior topics,
this question is not ranged on a Likert scale. As such, it produces binary results. Although this
has the potential to exclude less extreme viewpoints, it streamlines the process of determining
who wants to keep versus change the system.
Looking at a partisan division first, there is a very clear preference among Democrats for
amending the Constitution and eliminating the Electoral College (Figure 5.1). With the average
response exceeding 0.80, and an upper limit of 1, this shows over 80% of Democrats surveyed
would prefer getting rid of the Electoral College. This is opposed to the 0.27 average for
Republicans. This is also a statistically significant difference. Regression analysis for strictly the
impact of party on Electoral College preference produces a statistically significant p-value that is
< 0.01, as can be seen in Figure 5.5. This indicates a very strong relationship between party
identification and preference for amending the Electoral College. This provides preliminary
support for H5. Party is shown as being a significant factor in electoral college preference. To
reiterate a key point, this survey took place during the presidency of Donald Trump, a
Republican who won the Electoral College but lost the popular vote by quite a large margin. This
is a point that cannot be ignored when considering how Democrats versus Republicans would
have been thinking of the Electoral College at the time of the survey.
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When examining further demographics broken down by party, the levels of support are not
massively changed from the purely partisan breakdown. Looking at educational differences and
sex within each party, the graphs almost mirror the partisan breakdown (Figures 5.2 and 5.3).
Regardless of education and sex, Democrats have an average response around 0.8. The only
category slightly below the 0.8 mark is Democrats with less than a college degree. This indicates
very high levels of support for amending the Electoral College regardless of education or sex.
Similarly, Republicans have an average response between approximately 0.25 and 0.30,
irrespective of education and sex. This mirrors the responses in Figure 5.1.
When regressions are run on the impact of education and sex, as seen in Figure 5.5 for
neither demographic value is statistically significant for Democrats. This means that when
examining only Democrats, neither education level nor sex have an impact on Electoral College
preference that can definitively attributed to those variables. Education is also not statistically
significant for Republicans. However, sex is mildly statistically significant, with a p-value of
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0.09964 and positive coefficient of 0.101 indicating that Republican women (coded as “1”)
prefer amending the Electoral College more than Republican men.
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Age is the final demographic variable and demonstrates the most in-party diversity. This
diversity, though, is almost entirely attributable to 18–29-year-olds, for both Democrats and
Republicans. Figure 5.7 shows that for Democrats aged 18-29 there is total support for amending
the Constitution while the other age categories fall closer to previously seen average response,
around the 0.80 mark. However, age remains, like the other demographic variables for
Democrats, not statistically significant. This means that strictly party is important for Democrats
while deciding whether to support amending the Electoral College. Republicans see the same
overall trend, where 18–29-year-olds have an average response of about 0.50 compared to the
other age categories that fall between approximately 0.30 and 0.25. 30–49-year-old Republicans
do somewhat stand out since their average response is higher than the two 50+ year-old
categories that have almost identical responses. However, age is a statistically significant
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demographic variable for Republicans, at a p-value of 0.00746. This shows a stronger
relationship with Electoral College preference than sex, yet party is still more significant.
Practically, the negative coefficient means that the younger the Republican, the more they
support amending the Electoral College.
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The final hypothesis, H5, was generally supported (support for the Electoral College is a
purely partisan decision with no difference based on age, education, and sex across the parties).
There was a clear partisan divide is preference: generally, Democrats wanted to amend the
Electoral College and Republicans wanted to keep it. This was confirmed as being influenced by
party as the significance value showed a fairly strong, non-random connection. What was not
foreseen, though, was the influence of age. In both parties, 18-29-year-olds had a much higher
preference for amending the Electoral College than the other age groups. This was not only
present, but it was statistically significant for Republicans. One could see the lack of significance
of age for Democrats being a result of Democrats overall having such a high average value as is.
But with young Republicans, this average value stood out against the other age categories. This
is not to oversell the opinion of young Republicans; their average support for amending the
Electorally College was still drastically lower than any Democrat age group. But within
Republicans, their average was very high. As such, this significance of age shows that while yes,
party identification is the most important, age is influence within the group of self-identified
Republicans.
As for the Antifederalist context, this aligns with their perspective that the Constitution
would be far too difficult to change if the circumstance arose. Within this sample alone,
approximately 52.7% want the Electoral College amended compared to 44.5% that want to keep
it as is. This shows that at a bare minimum, a Constitutional change should be considered. Yet,
as the Antifederalists predicted, the bar is so high for change, that it is unlikely to be considered,
never mind actually happen.
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Limitations
No study is without limitations as they are a natural part of the research process. The most
significant limitation that cannot go unmentioned is the data itself. The data is from a reliable
source and provides insight into the topics of interest. It is not innately flawed in any way;
however, it is always preferable to have more control over the data. Running my own survey at
the scale of a Pew study would have been optimal. Questions could have been more specifically
targeted at the exact Antifederalist sentiment but having such a reduced sample size would not
have justified this choice. In an ideal situation, there would also have been one survey instead of
two. This would have allowed for equal sample sizes, the same respondents, and therefore more
consistency among the responses. As it stands, the questions related to rural versus suburban
versus urban attitudes were a different sample than all of the other questions. This is not
inherently an issue as both samples are reliable, yet one sample would have been ideal.
Further, with this study being historically based, there is of course going to be limits in the
understanding and situating of the historical content. Beginning with the understanding aspect,
any content analysis of historical documents naturally has some bias. Reading historical
documents in a modern context means that the reader has a modern-day perspective on the
historical issues. This is unavoidable, and even value in certain contexts, but it does mean that
the reader might not grasp the full intent of the original document. A reader in the late 1700s had
only their circumstances around which to consider the documents. Yet, a reader in 2022 has
nearly 250 years of American history in the back of their minds while reading The Antifederalist
Papers. Even while doing everything possible to remain objective, this history primes the reader
to examine the content in certain ways.
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As well, there is researcher influence. Different people reading The Antifederalist Papers
may focus on different aspects of them. The topics of focus in this research are defendable and
are objectively important parts of the Papers. Yet, another researcher may have seen other topics
as being more important. This depends on the lens the Papers are read through and the Papers
that were selected for examination. Future research directions include examining other Papers
and seeing what other objections could be examined in a modern lens. This would help better
round out the fairly narrow nature of this research.
Conclusion
Overall, it is fair to say that Antifederalist concerns still hold space in the minds of modernday Americans. Results in four out of the five tests show that public opinion algins with what
Antifederalists were concerned about. First, nationalism attitudes do support the Antifederalist
concerns about having a democratic republic govern such a large and diverse group of people.
There are clear and statistically significant differences between rural community views of federal
aid compared to suburban and urban communities, as shown in Figure 1.20 by the p-values all at
or below 0.05. Substantively, this means that regardless of party or aid type, rural residents are
more likely than suburban or urban residents to think that aid is unfairly distributed. Rural
residents see their community as underfunded and suburban and urban areas as overfunded. This
supports the idea of rural consciousness and the feeling among rural people that they have been
left behind and are not having their needs met. It also supports most of the claim made in H1
(Residents of rural communities, regardless of demographics, will view rural communities as
underfunded. As well, they will see suburban and urban communities as being overfunded while
those residents will see the level of aid as more fair. This trend will be strengthened as age
increases due to the amount of time that people have dealt with the consequences of
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over/underfunding). Age does not play as strong of a role as predicted, as it is only significant in
suburban aid evaluations, but the idea of rural areas being seen as underfunded and other areas
being seen as overfunded by those not living there did hold true.
There is also a clear, and statistically significant, partisan difference in the assessment of the
United States when compared against other countries. Republicans tend to rank the United States
as higher on the global totem pole than Democrats, as shown by the negative coefficient in
Figure 2.19. On individual questions asked, Republicans rank the United States higher than
Democrats on measures of the political system, science, economic health, health care, military,
public education, and standard of living. These differences are quite distinct and noticeably large.
The only area where Democrats have a higher average response than Republicans is in United
States universities, but the difference between Democrats and Republicans is minute and almost
non-existent. Education, though, is also important here with Republicans without college degrees
and Democrats with college degrees both having higher assessments than other groups. Yet,
partisanship is still the strongest factor in predicting attitudes. This provides support for most of
H2 (Republicans with college or advanced degrees will have about the same, or a slightly higher,
view of the United States as do Republicans with a college degree or less. For Democrats, those
with less education will have a more favorable view of the United States. However, for
Democrats there will also be an age factor where younger Democrats aged 18-29 will have a
much lower view of the United States than any other age group.) by emphasizing the role of
education for both Democrats and Republicans. Yet, the Democrat relationship went the opposite
direction than predicted and age did not play a significant role. Altogether, this shows that there
is a distinct difference in how Americans view the United States and indicates that there might be
deeper structural issues that prevent the effective governing of both groups with such distinct
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beliefs. This is not to say that there should be a split in the United States among party lines, but it
highlights the manifestation of the Antifederalist concern.
When comparing local versus state government and state versus federal government, local
and state government is preferred, respectively, in the raw data. There was a lack of explanation
and statistical significance found in the control variables that negates the relationship in the raw
data. Partisanship was minorly significant for the state versus federal test and a positive
coefficient indicates that Democrats have a stronger preference for state governments than
Republicans do (Figure 4.6). But the lack of significance for age, sex, or education in either test
for both parties cannot be ignored. The raw data trend is still present and aligns with
Antifederalist thought about closeness to government officials being important. Further research
would be able to better assess this relationship, though and see if the raw data trend was merely a
fluke of this data set. H4 (among all participants there will be increasingly favorable views for
government as the sector of government becomes closer to their everyday lives i.e., local
government is more favorable than state government, and state government is more favorable
than the federal government. This will be particularly true for those who are younger) is
unsubstantiated given the lack of statistical significance and therefore lack of a relationship,
overall.
Lastly, the case of the Electoral College shows that there was merit to the concern over the
Constitution being too difficult to amend. There is a majority of support for amending the
Electoral College, among all categories of Democrats and Republicans who are young and/or
female, but change is not realistically up for discussion. Partisanship is statistically significant
with a positive coefficient, showing that Democrats have higher levels of support for amending
the Electoral College. Democrats, though, have no significance on any other control variable,
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indicating that party is most important. Republicans have significance for age and sex and the
direction of the coefficients justify the claim of young and/or female Republican being more
supportive of change. This is in general support of H5 (support for the Electoral College is a
purely partisan decision with no difference based on age, education, and sex across the parties),
yet the important of age and sex for Republicans was not predicted.
The one exception is that surrounding presidentialism. It is indisputable that presidential
power has grown, like the Antifederalists were concerned about. But public opinion indicates
that everybody believes that the identity of the president matters. There is variance amongst
responses for the five individual questions about presidential identity, but the averaging of
responses led to each group categorizing presidential identity as at least “somewhat important”.
Statistical significance was found for Democrats divided by sex and both Democrats and
Republicans divided by education level. The coefficients indicate that, more specifically,
Republicans with no college degree and Democrats who are female and/or hold college degrees
would assess presidential identity as being of greater importance than other groups.
Antifederalists would have likely believed that identity would not matter as the Institution would
have acquired so much power. This fails to support H3 (As presidential power has grown over
time, the identity of the president will be seen as having less of an impact. People have likely
evolved to think that the Institution of the presidency is more important than the President
himself. This will be especially true for both Republicans and Democrats with less than a
college degree and those who are younger.) and in fact shows the opposite relationship.
That leaves the question of who would be considered a modern-day Antifederalist. This a
complex question and the answer is somewhat reductionist. There are different characteristics
that lead to different aspects of the Antifederalist identity. First is rural residency. Not all modern
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Antifederalists would be rural residents, but rural residency can be considered an indicator of
Antifederalist tendencies. This is also separate from different demographic characteristics, given
this information comes from a separate data set. The rest of the data suggests that younger,
female, Democrats with college degrees/advanced degrees would be the model when
conceptualizing a modern Antifederalist. This a generalization based on the majority of the data
and is not perfect. Further research would need to be done assessing more attitude types and
attitude strengths to make a more substantive claim. But, given the data and the groups that tend
to align the most with the Antifederalist perspective, this would be the expected make-up of an
Antifederalist today.
As for future areas of research, the first step would be to replicate this study. Data collected
today is likely to be different than the data used in this research. Not only because it is four years
old at this point, but because Trump is no longer president and lost reelection. Given the impact
his presidency had on this 2018 data, one could predict some reasonable changes in more current
data. This would also allow more research into the questionable areas of data. For example, the
lack of sample size for 18-29-year-old Republicans related to public education or the raw data
versus controlled data trends of federal aid share. Further research could help answer these
remaining questions.
Historically based research that compares the past to current politics provides insight into the
deeply rooted and longly held beliefs about the United States government. It would be incorrect
to assume that the feelings held both by Antifederalists and current Americans have been present
throughout the entire course of American history. However, the presence of similar attitudes
being present nearly 250 years later highlights the importance of these issues. Today, America is
deeply divided and seen by many as being on a tipping point. The current system works for few
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and is likely unsustainable without change. Regardless of party, this seems to be a core belief on
both sides. Perhaps, change could start with concerns that date back to the Antifederalists.
Instead of seeing Antifederalists as the “losers” of the Constitutional debates, they need to be
reframed as having valid points that were not addressed when, maybe, they should have been.
These findings contribute to the existing scholarship in important ways. The main addition is
the discussion of Antifederalism in a context outside of the 1770s. Literature, with good reason,
nearly always discusses Antifederalism within the context of the Constitutional ratification
process. They are dropped from discussion following the ratification process. But that is not the
end of their story. These people and their doubts did not disappear just because their side did not
win. Frankly, treating them like this is the case discredits their work. As can be seen throughout
this research, their concerns were valid. While they may have been seen as traitors, they were
truly patriots trying to build the best government possible.
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